We present two different formalizations of Equational Predicate Logic, that is, first order logic that uses Leibniz's substitution of "equals for equals" as a primary rule of inference.
colleagues at York University who, like the author, are teaching "Discrete Math" using the [GS1] text).
We aim in this paper to provide a precise syntax and semantics of a first order language and classical logic, as faithfully as possible to the spirit of the Equational Logic outlined in [GS1] , and then to carefully develop the metatheory to the point that soundness can be derived in a self contained manner. We also address (and prove) completeness by showing that the Equational Logic of [GS1] -as it is systematically reincarnated here-is an extension of some standard first order logic (our "standard" yardstick is the approach taken in Shoenfield [Sh] ).
As a by-product, we have reduced the very large number of Predicate Logicspecific axiom schemata offered in [GS1] (Chapters 8 and 9) to just two, and have reduced the additional "Leibniz" rule that is proposed in in Chapter 8-to a derived rule status (with a correction). Naturally, these reductions will make Equational Calculus even more attractive, as they will reduce the burden placed on memory of both students and instructors-not to mention that it makes the metamathematics much easier.
Formalizing an informal logic is not easy. One has to try to understand what the "intentions" of the informal version were, and implement them faithfully through the syntactic apparatus. Unfortunately, it is in the nature of "informal intentions" to be vague.
In this instance we inferred, partly from the practices in [GS1] and partly from those in [GS3] the following two important points, which shaped our formalization (sections 1 and 2):
(1) Every rule is supposed to be applicable to arbitrary formulas, not just to "universally valid" formulas. We draw this "inference" especially from [GS3] ( [GS1] give short shrift to the concept of proofs from a set of "nonlogical" axioms).
Indeed, all the rules of inference in [GS3] are given in the format (for example) "(Equanimity) P, P ≡ Q −→ Q" where −→ is metalogical.
In [GS3] , since all the rules are given in exactly this format-even the propositional rules-we had to conclude that the "unary" must mean "deducible from some (unspecified) nonlogical axioms", otherwise this logic would not be usable as a tool for reasoning in any mathematical theory! 1. Object variables. An enumerable set x 1 , x 2 , . . . . We normally use the metasymbols x, y, z, u, v, w with or without primes to stand for (object) variables.
1. Syntax
Definition. (Terms)
The set of terms, Term, is the ⊆-smallest set of strings or "expressions" over the alphabet 1-10 with the following two properties: Any of the items in 1 or 8 (a, b, c, x, y, z, etc.) 
are in Term.
If f is a function ‡ of arity n and t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t n are in Term, then so is the string f t 1 t 2 . . . t n .
Definition. (Atomic Formulas)
The set of atomic formulas, Af, contains precisely:
1) The symbols true, false, and every Boolean variable (that is, p, q, . . . ).
2) The strings t = s for every possible choice of terms t, s.
3) The strings P t 1 t 2 . . . t n for every possible choices of n-ary predicates P (for all choices of n > 0) and all possible choices of terms t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t n .
Definition. (Well-Formed
Formulas) The set of well-formed formulas, Wff, is the ⊆-smallest set of strings or "expressions" over the alphabet 1-10 with the following properties: a) Af ⊆ Wff.
b) If A, B are in Wff, then so are (A ≡ B), (A ⇒ B), (A ∧ B), (A ∨ B).
c) If A is in Wff, then so is (¬A).
d) If A is in Wff and x is any object variable (which may or may not occur (as a substring) in the formula A), then the string ((∀x)A) is also in Wff.
We say that A is the scope of (∀x).
Remark.
(1) A, B in the definition are so-called syntactic or meta-variables, used as names for (arbitrary) formulas. In general, we will let the letters A, B, C, D, E (with or without primes) be names for well-formed formulas, or just formulas as we often say. (2) We introduce a meta-symbol (∃) solely in the metalanguage via the definition "((∃x)A) stands for, or abbreviates, (¬((∀x)(¬A)))." (3) We often write more explicitly, ((∀x) A [x] ) and ((∃x)A[x]) for ((∀x)A) and ((∃x)A). This is intended to draw attention to the variable x of A, which ‡ We will omit the qualification "symbol" from terminology such as "function symbol", "constant symbol", "predicate symbol". has now become "bound". Of course, notwithstanding the notation A [x] (which only says that x may occur in A), x might actually not be a substring of A. In that case, intuitively, ((∀x)A), ((∃x)A) and A "mean" the same thing. This intuition is actually captured by the axioms and rules of inference, as we show in section 3 (3.7) . (4) In [GS1] the preferred metanotation for ((∀x)A) and ((∃x)A) is (∀x| : A) and (∃x| : A), respectively. They also have special (meta) notation for "bounded" quantification, that is (∀x|B : A) and (∃x|B : A) stand for ((∀x)(B ⇒ A)) and ((∃x)(B ∧ A)) respectively. In [GS1] the "B" part is called the "range" of the quantification.
(5) To minimize the use of brackets in the metanotation we adopt standard priorities, that is, ∀, ∃, and ¬ have the highest, and then we have (in decreasing order of priority) ∧, ∨, ⇒, ≡. All associativities are right (this is in variance with [GS1] , but is just another acceptable-and common-convention of how to be sloppy in the metalanguage, and get away with it). We will need a different quantifier symbol for each sort, say, ∀ i , ∀ r , ∀ b , etc., and for each sort a dedicated "equality" predicate (= i , = r , = b , etc.). Moreover, function symbols will have a sort or type associated with them (which will be the type of their right field in the intended interpretation). This will induce sorts (types) to all terms.
In the end of the day, we will turn around and use metanotation, suppressing the sort-subscripts (exactly as [GS1] do) and will let the context fend for the various (intended) sorts in the applications.
For this reason we do not burden the formal definition with many sorts. This deliberate omission will not restrict the applicability (to the multi-sorted case) of the few proof-theoretic and model-theoretic results included here.
It should be stated at once that should we feel the need to employ a Boolean object variable type explicitly, b 1 , b 2 , . . . , we would not allow the b i to be the same as the v 1 , v 2 , . . . . The former are terms, the latter are (atomic) well formed formulas.
Axioms and Rules of Inference
The axioms and rules of inference will be chosen from [GS1] . We will not allow schemata in the so-called propositional (or Boolean) axioms, in order to agree with the present [GS1] edition. This decision will necessitate the presence of a substitution rule among the rules of inference. We will deviate somewhat in the choice of axioms outside the propositional domain, to maximize convenience. In particular, we will only adopt one among the proposed axioms in [GS1] (Ax2 below), and one easy to memorize theorem that occurs in [GS1] (namely, the "standard" axiom-schema of instantiation or specialization) as our axiom Ax3. This apparatus will be sufficient to ensure completeness as we will show.
Definition. (Axioms and Axiom schemata)
Ax1. Include all propositional calculus axioms from [GS1] (there is no harm to actually include all tautologies, as, e.g., Enderton [En] and Manin [Man] do). † Ax2. (Schema) For every formulas A and B such that the variable x does not occur free in A, add
NB. The above is (9.5) in [GS1] . It is not necessary to introduce the "range" part.
Ax3. (Schema) For every formula A, add (∀x)A ⇒ A[x := t], for any term t
with a condition on t. The condition is that during substitution no variable of t (all such are free, of course) was "captured" by a quantifier. We say that "t must be substitutable in x".
NB.
We often see the above written as
where the presence of 
NB. The above is written usually as
or even
2.2 Remark.
(1) In any formal setting that introduces many-sorts explicitly in the syntax, one will need as many versions of Ax2-Ax5 as there are sorts. An alternative formal approach is to have only one sort of object variable but introduce one-place predicates D i , D r , D b , etc., in the alphabet-one for each sort-with the intended meanings: D i (x) "says" that x is an integer, D b (x) "says" that x is boolean, etc.
Thus, instead of, say, (
(2) Axioms Ax4-Ax5 characterize equality between "objects". [GS1] , while they employ this type of "Leibniz" in their exposition, they do not seem to actually formally adopt the point of view of Predicate Calculus with equality. In any case, adding these two axioms makes this system (explicitly) applicable to mathematical theories such as number theory and set theory, and does not in any way burden what we would like to outline here. Indeed, we will only use these axioms in section 6.
(3) In Ax3 and Ax5 we imposed the condition that t must to be "substitutable" in x. I.e., it should not contain free variables that can be "captured" by quantification, as this would distort and invalidate the formula.
The following example is often given in the literature in order to illustrate what might happen after a mindless substitution: The meta-remedy (advocated by many, for example, Shoenfield [Sh] ) is to move the quantified variable(s) out of harm's way, i.e., rename them so that no quantified variable in A has the same name as any (free, of course) variable in t.
This renaming is formally correct (i.e., it does not change the meaning of the formula) as we will see in the "variant" (meta)theorem in section 3. Of course, it is always possible to effect this renaming since we have countably many variables, and only finitely many appear free in t and A.
This trivial remedy allows us to render the conditions in Ax3 and Ax5 harmless. Essentially, a t is always "substitutable" after renaming.
Definition. (Rules of Inference)
The following four are the rules of inference. These rules are relations on the set Wff and are written traditionally as "fractions". We call the "numerator" the premise(s) and the "denominator" the conclusion.
We say that a rule of inference is applied to the formula(s) in the numerator, and that it yields (or results in) the formula in the denominator.
Any set S ⊆ Wff is closed under some rule of inference iff whenever the rule is applied to formulas in S, it also yields formulas in S.
Inf1. (Substitution) For any formulas A, B and any propositional variable p that may or may not occur in A (as a substring)
with a condition. Namely, if p is in the scope of a quantifier (∀x) , then x must not be free in B. (1) Let P be any 1-ary ("unary") predicate and a any constant. Clearly, (∀x)(P x ⇒ P x) ⇒ P a ⇒ P x is not universally valid, as an interpretation over N with P x translated to say "x is even" and a to be "the" 0 shows. Indeed a falsifying instance would be (∀x) 
, where P N denotes the "concrete" interpretation of P over N that we have just suggested.
Yet, (∀x)(P x ⇒ p) ⇒ P a ⇒ p is universally valid. This explains the "condition" for the substitution rule.
(2) Leibniz for formulas is the primary rule in [GS1] that supports "equational reasoning". In standard approaches to logic it is not a primary rule, rather it appears as the well known "derived rule" (metatheorem) that if Γ A ≡ B † and if we replace one or more occurrences of the subformula A of a formula
Shoenfield [Sh] calls this derived rule "the equivalence theorem". (3) [GS1] use "=" for "≡" in contexts where they want the symbol to act conjunctionally, rather than associatively, e.g., in successive steps of an equationalstyle proof.
We next define Γ-theorems, that is, formulas we can prove from the set of formulas Γ (this may be empty).
Definition. (Γ-theorems)
The set of Γ-theorems, Thm Γ , is the ⊆-smallest subset of Wff that satisfies the following:
Th1. Thm Γ contains as a subset the closure under Inf1 † of: All the axioms in the group Ax1 and all the instances of axiom schemata Ax2-Ax5.
We call the members of this closure the logical axioms.
Th2. Γ ⊆ Thm Γ . We call every member of Γ a nonlogical axiom.
The (meta)statement A ∈ Thm Γ is traditionally written as Γ A, and we say that A is proved from Γ or that it is a Γ-theorem. If Γ = ∅, then rather than ∅ A we write A. We often say in this case that A is absolutely provable (or provable with no nonlogical axioms).
Remark.
The restriction in the application of Inf1 means that we use it simply to eliminate propositional variables, in particular to turn the axioms of group Ax1 to axiom-schemata. We also, in effect, eliminate its anachronistic presence from our logic, by "applying it up in front" in the course of a deduction. See also 3.24.
Definition. (Γ-proofs)
A finite sequence A 1 , . . . , A n of members of Wff is a Γ-proof iff every A i , for i = 1, . . . , n is one of Pr1. A logical axiom (as in Th1 above).
Pr2. A member of Γ.
Pr3. The result of a rule Inf2-Inf4 applied to (an) appropriate formula(s) A j with j < i. † "The closure of a set S under an operation O" is the ⊆-smallest set containing the members of S and closed under O.
Remark.
(1) It is a well known result on inductive definitions that Γ A is equivalent to "A appears in some Γ-proof"-in the sense of the above definition-and also equivalent to "A is at the end of some Γ-proof".
(2) It follows from 2.7 that if each of A 1 , . . . , A n has a Γ-proof and B has an {A 1 , . . . , A n }-proof, then B has a Γ-proof. Indeed, simply concatenate each of the given Γ-proofs (in any sequence). Append to the right of that sequence the given {A 1 , . . . , A n }-proof (that ends with B). Clearly, the entire sequence is a Γ-proof, and ends with B.
We refer to this phenomenon as the transitivity of . 
Some Metatheorems (and the occasional theorem)

Metatheorem. For any formula A and any set of formulas
is an axiom (from group Ax1-we are using liberties granted to us by the symmetry and associativity of ≡).
Thus, using Inf1 and [p := A] on (1), we get
The assumption Γ A, (3) above, and equanimity, yield
(←) From [GS1] , true, and hence, for any Γ, Γ true. Thus, the assumption Γ A ≡ true, and equanimity, yield Γ A. 
x is substitutable in x always.
By the hypothesis and modus ponens (a valid derived rule), we obtain Γ A.
Corollary. ("Strong" Generalization) For any formula A, A (∀x)A.
Proof. Take Γ = {A} above.
"Strong" implies that there is a weak generalization rule as well. In approaches to first order logic that contain only propositional rules of inference (e.g., [Bou] , [En] , where the only rule is modus ponens † ), metatheorem 3.3 requires the constraint-in the only-if direction-that x is not free in any formula of Γ that is used in the deduction of A. In particular, A (∀x)A does not hold (see also 3.23(2) Proof. Of course, the t i must be "substitutable" in the respective variables. One can comfortably be silent about this in view of the variant theorem (3.10, below) .
We illustrate the proof for n = 2. What makes it interesting is the requirement to have "simultaneous substitution". To that end we first substitute into x 1 and x 2 new variables z, w-i.e., not occurring in either A or in the t i . The proof is the following sequence.
Now z := t 1 , w := t 2 , in any order, is the same as "simultaneous substitution"
Theorem. For any formulas A, B such that the object variable x is not free in A, A ⇒ (∀x)B ≡ (∀x)(A ⇒ B).
Proof. This is so by Ax2, A ⇒ B ≡ ¬A ∨ B, and Leibniz for formulas (Inf2).
Corollary. For any formulas A in which the object variable x is not free,
A ≡ (∀x)A.
Proof. We have (∀x)A ⇒ A anyway.
In the equational style we write 
Metatheorem. For any formulas A, B such that the object variable x is not free in
Then Γ (∀x)(A ⇒ B) by 3.3, hence Γ A ⇒ (∀x)B by 3.6 (and equanimity).
Then Γ (∀x)(A ⇒ B) by 3.6 (and equanimity), hence Γ A ⇒ B by 3.3. NB. We often write this (under the stated conditions) as (∀x) 
Corollary. For any formulas A, B such that the object variable x is
Proof. We know that (∀x)A ⇒ A[x := z] (Ax3), since z is substitutable in x under the stated conditions. Thus, by 3.3,
Noting that x is not free in (∀z)A[x := z] and is substitutable in z (in A[x := z]), we can repeat the above argument to get ⇐.
At this point we will be well advised to increase our metatheoretical convenience † by introducing two important results, namely, Post's tautology Theorem, and (Herbrand's) Deduction Theorem, in that order.
We first offer a careful definition of "tautologies" in Predicate Calculus.
Definition. (Prime formulas in Wff)
A formula A ∈ Wff is a prime formula iff it is any of
Pri1. Atomic
Pri2. A formula of the form (∀x)A.
Let P denote the set of all prime formulas in our language. Clearly, P contains each propositional variable v 1 , v 2 , . . . .
That is, a prime formula has no "explicit" propositional connectives (in the case Pri2 any connectives are hidden inside the scope of (∀x)).
Clearly, A ∈ Wff iff A is a Propositional Calculus formula over P (i.e, propositional variables will be all the strings in P − {true, false}).
Definition. (Tautologies in Wff)
A formula A ∈ Wff is a tautology iff it is so when viewed as a Propositional Calculus formula over P.
We call the set of all tautologies, as defined here, Taut. The symbol |= Taut A says A ∈ Taut.
The following generalizes 3.12 and will also be needed. † The emphasis here is meant to draw a distinction between convenience and "power". Whatever power we have got stems directly from the axioms and the rules of inference, and the definition of Γ-theorem or Γ-proof. All else that we add is just "convenience". 
where , everywhere above, is achieved by staying within the axiom group Ax1.
Thus, if we transform A into A by applying any sequence of the above equivalences to eliminate all occurrences of true and false and all the connectives except ¬ and ∨, then we have, on the one hand, that |= Taut A and on the other hand (by the Leibniz rule) that A ≡ A .
Thus, by equanimity, it suffices to prove A .
A better way to say all this is that, without loss of generality, we assume that the only connectives in A are among ∨ and ¬ and that the constants true and false do not occur. Moreover, since A ∨ A ≡ A, we may assume without loss of generality that A is a string A 1 ∨ · · · ∨ A n with n ≥ 2, so that none of the A i is a formula C ∨ D. We are assuming metanotational abbreviations when it comes to bracketing.
Let us call an A i reducible iff it has the form ¬(C ∨ D) or ¬(¬C).
Otherwise it is irreducible. Thus, the only possible irreducible A i have the form p or ¬p (where p ∈ P − {true, false}). We say that A is irreducible iff all the A i are.
We define the reducibility degree of A i to be the number of ¬ or ∨ connectives in it, not counting a possible leftmost ¬. The reducibility degree of A is the sum of the reducibility degrees of all its A i .
So let |= Taut A, where A is the string A 1 ∨ · · · ∨ A n , n ≥ 2, where none of the A i is a formula C ∨ D, and prove (following Shoenfield) by induction on the reducibility degree of A that A.
For the basis, let A be an irreducible tautology. It must be that A is a string of the form "· · · ∨ p ∨ · · · ¬p ∨ · · · " for some p, otherwise (if no p appears both "positively" and "negatively") we can find a truth-assignment that makes A false-a contradiction (assign false to p's that occur positively only, and true to those that occur negatively only).
Since we have both semantic and syntactic commutativity, let us simplify notation and assume that A is p ∨ ¬p ∨ B. We know enough from [GS1] to conclude that p ∨ ¬p ∨ B.
Let then A i be reducible. Again, since we have both semantic and syntactic commutativity, let us assume without restricting generality that i = 1.
We have two cases: (1) A has the form ¬(¬C) ∨ D (i.e., A 1 is the string ¬(¬C)). Clearly C ∨ D is also a tautology, of a lower reducibility degree, hence provable (by Induction Hypothesis-in short, I.H.). Thus, true = by I.H. 
Corollary. If
Proof. It is an easy semantic exercise to see that
By 3.14,
Applying modus ponens n times to (1) we get
The above corollary is very convenient. We normally apply it as follows (compare with remark 2.8 (2) For a proof, let us call Thm Γ the set inductively defined here, and show that Thm Γ = Thm Γ .
(⊆) We do induction on Thm Γ . We note that Thm Γ satisfies (1) it contains the same initial objects as Thm Γ (compare Th1-Th2 with (i)-(ii)), (2) it is closed under Inf2,
it is closed under rules (iii), by 3.15 and transitivity of .
The set Thm Γ being the ⊆-smallest with properties (1)-(3), we are done.
(⊇) We do induction on Thm Γ . We note that Thm Γ satisfies (4) it contains the same initial objects as Thm Γ (compare (i)-(ii) with Th1-Th2),
it is closed under Inf2, (6) it is closed under rules Inf3-Inf4 since each of them has its conclusion tautologically implied by the premises(s), so, it is a rule of type (iii).
The set Thm Γ being the ⊆-smallest with properties (4)- (6), we are done once more.
Neither of Inf1, Inf2 has the form of a tautological implication. 
Corollary. Γ A iff there is a sequence of formulas A 1 , . . . , A n such that A n is B (identical strings), and each A i satisfies one of the following conditions:
(a) A i is a logical axiom, (b) A i ∈ Γ,
Lemma. For any formulas A and B, (∀x)(A ⇒ B) ⇒ (∀x)A ⇒ (∀x)B.
Proof. We write an annotated proof (omitting redundant brackets):
and 3.15 (3), and 3.15 4) , and 3.4
, 3.6, and equanimity
Lemma. For any A, B, C such that x is not free in A, A ⇒ (B ≡ C) A ⇒ ((∀x)B ≡ (∀x)C).
Proof. We write an annotated proof:
and 3.15 (4), and 3.15
we are done by 3.15.
Metatheorem. (The Deduction Theorem) If A is closed and Γ, A B,
then Γ A ⇒ B.
NB. Γ, A means Γ ∪ {A}.
A converse of the metatheorem is also true, without any restriction on A: That is, Γ A ⇒ B implies Γ, A B. This follows by modus ponens. We only use the Deduction theorem in section 6. 
Proof. The proof is by induction on Γ,
(Leibniz) Let Γ, A C ≡ D, and B be the string E[p := C] ≡ E[p := D] for
some formula E and propositional variable p.
By I.H., Γ A ⇒ (C ≡ D).
By induction on the formula E, we show that
Basis. If E is any of true, false, q, P t 1 . . . t n , or t 1 = t 2 , then the right hand side of ⇒ in (1) reads E ≡ E and the result is trivial (from E ≡ E, and 3.15).
If E is p, then the right hand side of ⇒ in (1) reads C ≡ D, and the sought result is identical to the I.H.
Let then E be ¬G (in least parenthesized metanotation). By I.H.,
thus (1) follows from 3.15 and
Let next E be G • H (in least parenthesized metanotation, where • is any of ≡, ∨, ∧, ⇒). By I.H.,
Since A is closed, x is not free in A. Thus, by 3.19,
that is, (1) holds. ( 1 ) † Let a truth assignment make the left of |= Taut true. The "hard case" is when it makes A true at the same time. This forces all the A i to be true, and by (2), B to be true. ‡ Thus, in particular, Γ is "aware" of some additional facts. For example, Γ e = e, whereas "e = e" is meaningless in (the language of) Γ. establishes (2), hence (1). In practice, one does not perform this step explicitly, but ensures that throughout the Γ, A-proof, whatever free variables were present in A "behave like constants".
(Tautological implication rules)
(2) In some expositions the Deduction Theorem is not constrained by requiring that A be closed (e.g., [Bou] , and more recently [En] ).
Which version is right? They both are. If all the rules of inference are "propositional" (e.g., as in [Bou, En] , who only employ modus ponens), then the Deduction theorem is unconstrained. If, on the other hand, the rules of inference manipulate object variables via quantification, then one cannot avoid constraining the application of the deduction Theorem, lest one wants to derive (the invalid) A ⇒ (∀x)A from the valid A (∀x)A.
How do [Bou, En] cope with this issue? Well, in their approach they do not have A (∀x)A. They have instead the weaker Γ A iff Γ (∀x)A, with the condition (in the only-if direction) that x not be free in any formula of Γ used in the deduction of A.
(3) This divergence of approach in choosing rules of inference has some additional repercussions.
One has to be careful in defining the semantic counterpart of , namely, |= (see next section). One wants the two symbols to "track each other" faithfully (Gödel's completeness theorem). † We state a metatheorem that allows some additional flexibility in substitutions. It shows that we can apply substitution (to a known absolute theorem) post facto. There are only two induction steps, by 3.16.
(Leibniz) A is C[s := D] ≡ C[s := E] and D ≡ E (we may view s as a new
variable, in particular, different from p).
Soundness
The easiest way to introduce Tarski semantics is to follow Shoenfield.
Definition.
Given a language L = (V, Term, Wff), a structure M = (M, I) appropriate for L is such that M = ∅ is a set (the "domain") and I is a mapping that assigns 4) to each propositional variable p of V a unique member p I of the two element set {t, f} (we understand t as "true" and f as "false") (5) moreover we set true I = t and false I = f, where the use of "=" here is metamathematical (equality on {t, f}).
We would now like to take a formula A, transform each one of its syntactic ingredients-except free variables-S into its "concrete" counterpart S I to finally obtain A I . We could then say that A is valid in M, and write |= M A to mean that A I is true for all values (from M ) "plugged into" its free variables. This can be done as follows (among other ways).
Definition. Given L and a structure
denotes the language obtained from L by adding in V a unique nameî for each object i ∈ M . This amends both sets Term, Wff into Term(M), Wff(M). Members of the latter sets are called M-terms and M-formulas respectively.
We extend I to the new constants:î I = i for all i ∈ M (where the metamathematical "=" is that on M ).
All we have done here is to allow ourselves to do substitutions like [x := i] formally. We do instead, [x :=î].
One next gives "meaning" to all closed terms in L(M).
Definition. For closed terms t in Term(M) we define the symbol t
(1) If t is any of a (original constant) orî (imported constant), then t I has already been defined. t is the string f t 1 . . . t n , where f is n-ary, and t 1 , . . . , t n are closed Mterms, we define t I to be the object (of M ) f
(2) If
Finally, we give meaning to all closed M-formulas (that is, M-sentences).
Definition.
For closed formulas A in Wff(M) we define the symbol A I inductively. In all cases, A I ∈ {t, f}.
(1) If A is any of p or true or false, then A I has already been defined.
(2) If A is the string t = s, where t and s are closed M-terms, then A I = t iff t I = s I (again, the last two occurrences of = refer to equality on {t, f} and M respectively).
(3) If A is the string P t 1 . . . t n , where P is an n-ary predicate and the t i are closed M-terms, then 
Let A ∈ Wff and M be a structure as above. An M-instance of A is a sentence A ∈ Wff(M) obtained from A by substituting various constantsî,ĵ, . . . into all the free variables of A.
For any set of formulas Γ from Wff, |= M Γ denotes the sentence "M is a model of Γ", and means that for all A ∈ Γ, |= M A.
A formula A is universally valid (we often say just valid) iff every structure appropriate for the language is a model of A. We then simply write |= A.
Definition. We say that Γ logically implies A, in symbols Γ |= A, to mean that every model of Γ is also a model of A.
This is the correct definition for "logically implies" in those approaches that allow "strong generalization" (3.4) . In particular, this definition allows that A |= (∀x)A-as we indeed require in order to "match" the syntactic A (∀x)A. The flip side of this is that |= A ⇒ B and A |= B are not equivalent. A pure theory is one with Γ = ∅.
Remark.
In the next section we will consider two different ways to "do logic", and therefore will have two kinds of first order theories. One will be as in the definition above. We will call it an "E-theory", to indicate that the logical axioms and especially the rules of inference support equational reasoning. The other will be as developed in [Sh] . We will call such a theory an "S-theory". If A is an instance of Ax3, then a proof that A I = t for any M-instance A of A is easily accessible in the literature (e.g., [En] , [Men] ; [Sh] handles the dual axiom B[x := t] ⇒ (∃x)B, where t is substitutable in x). The literature also takes care of the equality axioms (Ax4 and Ax5). Let us here look into Ax2.
where x is not free in B. Let
be an M-instance of (1). We need to show that
Assume the left side of iff. Then (B) I = f and ( is the meaning of an M-instance of B ∨ C, and is, of course, f. Thus, the right side of iff is f (by 4.4). The other direction is similar. We next show that if A is the conclusion of a rule, then it is universally valid if the premises are so. By 3.16, we only look at Leibniz.
Leibniz.
and
By induction on the formula B, one proves
The interesting induction step is when B is (∀x)E, and p occurs in E-but without loss of generality in neither C nor D.
Compare ( A by-product of soundness is consistency. A theory Γ is consistent iff Thm Γ ⊂ Wff (proper subset). Thus, the pure E-theory is consistent, since, by soundness, false is not provable.
Completeness
Definition. A theory Γ is complete iff Γ |= A implies Γ A for any formula A.
One way to show completeness of the pure E-theory is to offer a proof in the style of Henkin. A much easier way is to show that the pure E-theory is at least as powerful as the pure S-theory.
Shoenfield allows no propositional variables, and admits therefore axiom schemata throughout.
The axioms in Shoenfield are
S-Ax1
The schema A ∨ ¬A
S-Ax2
The dual of Ax3, namely, A[x := t] ⇒ (∃x)A, where t is substitutable in x S-Ax3 The E-schemata Ax4 and Ax5.
The rules of inference (after the tautology theorem) boil down to Proof. The trivial proof on theorems (of S) is omitted. We only note that E A ∨ ¬A by 3.14.
S-Inf1
In order to prove next that |= A implies E A, via S, we need a simple technical Lemma.
Lemma. Let A be a formula over the language L of section 1, and let p be a propositional variable that occurs in A.
Extend the language L by adding P , a new 1-ary predicate symbol.
Proof. (|=) The only-if is by soundness (substitution 3.24 was used). For the if-part pick any structure M = (M, I) and let A be an M-instance of A. Expand M to M = (V, I ) where I is the same as I, except that it also gives meaning to P as follows:
( ) The only-if is the result of 3.24. For the if part, let E A[p := (∀x)P x]. By induction on ∅-theorems we show that E A as well.
Basis. A[p := (∀x)P x] is a logical axiom (see 2.5). If it is a substitution (Inf1) instance of a formula in group Ax1, then it is a tautology. But then so is A, hence (by 3.14) E A. Ax4 is not applicable (it cannot contain (∀x)P x). It is clear that if A[p := (∀x)P x] is an instance of one of the schemata Ax2-Ax3 or Ax5, then replacing all occurrences of (∀x)P x in A[p := (∀x)P x] by the propositional variable p results to a formula of the same form, so A is still an axiom, hence E A. Completeness and soundness were proved for a pure "E-theory" that has a different (much smaller) axiom set than the one given in [GS1] . The next section shows the equivalence of the present pure theory with the one offered in [GS1] .
Comparison with the Equational Logic of [GS1]
We prove that each rule or axiom on quantification that is offered in [GS1] , chapters 8 and 9, is "derived" (hence redundant or dependent) in the E-logic that we have presented here (definitions 2.1, 2.3 and 2.5). We write meaning E throughout. Nomenclature and numbers given in brackets are those in [GS1] .
A.1 "Leibniz (8.12)" The following two rules are meant to supplement the "propositional" version given in [GS1] , towards predicate calculus duty ([GS1] , p.148).
The first is a direct application of Inf2, where, without loss of generality, (1) is not valid, unless we drop "D ⇒" on the premise side (should read just A ≡ B), in which case it follows from Inf2 exactly like the first of the two (8.12)-rules.
Indeed, take D to be x = 0, C to be (∀x)p, A to be x = 0 and B to be true. Then,
that is (⇐) A standard result (from Ax4, Ax5) is that x = y ⇒ y = x (e.g., [Sh] ). By 3.5, x = t ⇒ t = x, thus (3.15 and Ax5) A[t] ⇒ x = t ⇒ A.
As x is not free in A[t], 3.8 yields A[t] ⇒ (∀x)(x = t ⇒ A).
A. 4 "Distributivity (8.15) ".
(∀x)(A ⇒ B) ∧ (∀x)(A ⇒ C) ≡ (∀x)(A ⇒ B ∧ C).
(see the remark following 3.4) that since Inf2 yields "strong generalization", first order Logics such as [Bou, En] do not support it.
We show how such Logics can be recast in the Equational Logic paradigm. We base our discussion here, for the sake of concreteness, to the version of first order Logic as it is defined in [En] . We start by describing this logic.
We allow propositional variables in formulas only for the purpose of making the statement of "Leibniz", below, easy. The only connectives are ¬, ⇒, ∀. The remaining connectives-≡, ∨, ∧, ∃ -are introduced as abbreviations, and the same holds for the constants (0-ary propositional connectives in reality) true and false (for example, in view of the theorem (A ≡ A) ≡ (B ≡ B), we abbreviate any occurrence of A ≡ A by true).
There is only one rule of inference, modus ponens. The axioms (schemata) are all the possible "partial" generalizations † of the following For a proof, we note that the following Metatheorem ("restricted generalization") holds in [En] † The tautology theorem holds in [En] .
Indeed, the proof of modus ponens above makes it clear that all we really need is a propositional Leibniz, P L, that is
, where p is not in the scope of a quantifier (P L)
In an application of P L, we do not require that A ≡ B.
We can summarize this discussion thus: [En] ). In this logic, "full" Leibniz (Inf2) is not derivable.
An instructor teaching Equational Logic to first year students will probably be tempted to "interpret" [GS1] logic in this simpler framework-using P L and demonstrating that both L2 and no-capture Leibniz are derived rules.
This alternative version may well prove more palatable in the classroom, if for no other reason, because of the simplicity of its rules of inference and its support for an unconstrained Deduction Theorem.
